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Advance Refusals and the Personal Identity Objection 
 
Shaun D Pattinson* 
I. Introduction 
Imagine Anna who contemplates requiring future medical treatment or care, and 
wishes to make a decision to be applied when she is no longer competent. She wishes 
to ensure that, if specified circumstances occur, she will not be given life-sustaining 
treatment and will therefore be allowed to die. The moral and legal authority of such 
an advance refusal can clearly be no greater than the authority of a contemporaneous 
refusal.
1
 It could, however, be less. In English law, an adult has an almost unlimited 
right to contemporaneously refuse treatment, even if life-sustaining.
2
 And, under s 
26(1) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (the 2005 Act), a ‘valid’ and ‘applicable’ 
advance refusal of treatment has the same legal force as a valid contemporaneous 
refusal. Thus, in theory at least, an advance refusal complying with certain procedural 
conditions is binding in English law. 
Advance refusals—indeed any attempt to give effect to a patient’s prior views and 
values—present two challenges. The first challenge is ensuring that an advance 
refusal sufficiently represents Anna’s will on what should happen in the situation in 
which she later finds herself. The application of Anna’s previous refusal presents 
practical difficulties beyond those presented by a contemporaneous refusal by a 
competent individual. The issue is that the scope and meaning of her wishes needs to 
be interpreted in a context with potentially unanticipated features without the ability 
to return to Anna for further discussion and consideration. The second challenge 
builds on Parfit’s musings on personal identity3 and will be referred to as the personal 
identity objection. According to this objection, 
the very process that renders the individual incompetent and brings the advance 
directive into play can—and indeed often does—destroy the conditions necessary for 
her personal identity and thereby undercuts entirely the moral authority of the 
directive.
4
 
That is to say, some contend that the loss of ability to make contemporaneous 
treatment decisions will (at least sometimes) change Anna’s identity, so that the 
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individual to whom the advance refusal is to apply is no longer Anna. 
This chapter will evaluate the response of English law to these two challenges by 
reference to the ethical rationalism of Gewirth, as expanded and applied by 
Beyleveld.
5
 The focus will be on the second challenge, namely, the personal identity 
objection. Support will be offered for the implicit rejection of this objection by 
English law. It will be argued that the plausibility of the personal identity objection 
derives from the principle that life-sustaining treatment should not be removed at the 
whim of a third party, but (contrary to appearances) the objection does not fully 
engage this principle. It will also be argued that while at first sight it appears that the 
approach of English law to the first challenge suggests some normative inconsistency 
with its response to the second, in practice, this normative inconsistency is more 
apparent than real. That is, the response of English law to the challenge of ensuring 
that the advance refusal represents Anna’s will is evolving and thereby becoming 
easier to reconcile with its rejection of the personal identity objection. 
A preliminary terminological issue arises with regard to the use of ‘competence’ and 
‘capacity’ in this chapter.6 An individual will be described as competent when judged 
to possess sufficient cognitive-functional faculties to be able to make a decision with 
respect to a given situation. An individual will be said to have capacity when 
possessing the decision-making authority required for a legally valid decision. This 
distinction is useful because capacity need not track competence. In English law, for 
example, a child who is considered cognitively able to make a particular treatment 
decision (that is, competent) may be denied the legal authority (that is, capacity) to 
validly refuse treatment in the face of judicial or parental consent.
7
 An attribution of 
competence (so defined) requires that the patient be considered to have the cognitive 
ability to understand and able to exercise that ability in the context under 
consideration. Since competence is task specific, patients who apparently have the 
cognitive abilities to make a decision must be considered to lack competence if they 
apparently cannot exercise those abilities in relation to a specific task or decision. For 
example, a patient who is completely overcome with emotion every time she thinks 
about her cancer is (unless and until this is addressed) incompetent to make decisions 
concerning her cancer, even if considered cognitively able to make other decisions at 
an equivalent level of complexity. 
II. The Personal Identity Objection  
The personal identity objection has its origins in the view that psychological 
continuity with one’s past self is a necessary condition for personal identity. 8 
                                                 
5
  See eg A Gewirth, Reason and Morality (University of Chicago Press, 1978); D Beyleveld, 
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  J Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (R Wooldhouse ed, Penguin Classics, 
1997) 302; Parfit, n 3, 204–09. 
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According to this view, continuity with previous memories, states and dispositions 
varies in degree and a sufficient degree of continuity is required for the retention of 
personal identity.
9
 An individual who falls below the relevant threshold of continuity 
is severed from his or her past identity and, if alive, acquires a different identity.
10
 
Such is said to have occurred when an individual’s memory retention and personality 
is considered to have changed profoundly. In such circumstances, it is supposed, 
giving effect to an advance refusal involves illegitimately applying one individual’s 
will to a different individual. 
There are two important points about the personal identity objection to which I will 
return below. First, to regard Anna in the past (Anna Then) as a different individual to 
Anna in the present (Anna Now) is to deprive Anna Then of various rights and 
responsibilities over her body in the future. Secondly, it requires a particular type of 
metaphysical story to be told about the two Annas. Anna Then must be considered to 
have either a continued existence disconnected from her physical body or to have 
ceased to exist. Similarly, the living body of Anna Now must be considered to be 
either connected to a different mind or an empty shell without a mind.
11
 
Supporters of the personal identity objection differ with regard to its ambit. This 
chapter will examine and respond to the use of this objection by Dresser and 
Buchanan. Dresser rejects the authority of advance refusals in favour of treating 
incompetent patients according to their ‘present best interests’ and invokes the 
personal identity objection as one of her reasons.
12
 She cites Parfit to support her view 
that where Anna has ‘undergone substantial psychological alteration’, Anna Then’s 
views lack moral authority with regard to the treatment of Anna Now.
13
 In contrast, 
Buchanan holds that Anna Then’s past views only become irrelevant if Anna Now, 
though incompetent, is a person.
14
 He argues that imposing advance decisions on 
another person involves their subjugation (and is thereby analogous to slavery), 
whereas non-persons can legitimately be subject to the ‘surviving interests’ of the past 
person they used to be.
15
 Buchanan’s conditions for personhood are sufficiently 
similar to Gewirth’s conditions for agency to enable them to be considered equivalent 
for the purposes of this chapter.
16
 That is to say that, in this chapter, a person/agent is 
a being that is capable of acting for voluntarily chosen purposes. 
                                                 
9
  See esp Buchanan, n 4, 280. 
10
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15
  See Buchanan, n 4, esp 281–82 and 287. 
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Three Hypothetical Patients 
To facilitate discussion of the personal identity objection, as invoked by Dresser and 
Buchanan, consider three hypothetical patients with key differences with regard to 
their current abilities: Bob, Cuc and Eve. All have made advance refusals of life-
sustaining treatment to be applied in specified future circumstances, which now arise. 
At the time of making those refusals, all were adults considered to have acted both 
voluntarily and competently, and to have understood their medical prognosis and 
future medical situation. All three appear to have suffered significant (in some cases 
total) memory loss. Doctors consider administration of the care or treatment refused 
in the advance refusals to be necessary to keep the patients alive. 
Bob: Antibiotics Refused in Advance of a Vegetative State 
Following a stroke, Bob is judged to be in a vegetative state. His heart continues to 
beat, his brain-stem continues to function, he turns, he sleeps and he wakes, but is 
considered irreversibly unconscious due to damage to his higher brain.
17
 He had made 
an advance refusal of antibiotics to be applied if he enters a vegetative state. Bob now 
has an infection, which can be treated with antibiotics. 
Dresser and Buchanan differ over Bob. Both would consider Bob Then and Bob Now 
to be different individuals. Buchanan cites a permanent vegetative state as an example 
of a condition that severs psychological continuity and therefore causes a loss of 
personal identity.
18
 Dresser and Buchanan differ, however, because Buchanan’s view 
is that Bob Now is a ‘nonperson’ and Bob Then has surviving interests that ‘override 
whatever extremely limited obligations we may have to sustain the life of the 
surviving individual’.19 Dresser is likely to agree that not providing antibiotics to Bob 
is defensible, but this would not be because Bob Then’s advance refusal applies; 
rather it would be because antibiotics are simply not in Bob Now’s interests. In short, 
Buchanan would apply Bob’s advance refusal, whereas Dresser would consider it to 
lack authority on the basis of the personal identity objection. 
Cuc: Antibiotics Refused in Advance of Severe Dementia 
Cuc
20
 is suffering from Alzheimer’s disease. During the very early stages, she made 
an advance refusal of antibiotics and any other life-saving treatment. Her condition 
has deteriorated significantly and she now lives at home with the help of carers. She 
has apparent problems making new memories and those around her consider her old 
memories to be fading rapidly. Cuc talks to those around her and is considered able to 
make some simple day-to-day decisions. She regularly reads, though her place in the 
book seems to jump randomly from one day to the next, and paints, though she paints 
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 See B Jennett, ‘The Vegetative State’ (2002) 73 Journal of Neurology Neurosurgery and 
Psychiatry 355. 
18
  Buchanan, n 4, 280–81. 
19
  Buchanan, n 4, 287. 
20
  Cuc is loosely based on Margo: see AD Firlik, ‘Margo’s Logo’ (1991) 265 Journal of the 
American Medical Association 201 and R Dworkin, Life Dominion: An Argument about 
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the same picture every day. Her carers consider her to be extremely happy and 
gaining great pleasure from her activities. Cuc now has a chest infection and requires 
antibiotics. Her doctors consider her to lack the competence required to make this 
decision. 
Cuc is the type of patient for whom the personal identity objection is typically raised. 
Dresser and Buchanan consider apparently permanent memory loss capable of 
depriving a dementia patient of her past identity.
21
 Their writings suggest that both 
would consider Cuc Now to lack sufficient psychological continuity with Cuc Then to 
be considered the same individual. Both would conclude that her advance refusal now 
lacks moral authority on account of the personal identity objection and would want 
her to be treated with antibiotics. 
Buchanan only accepts the validity of the personal identity objection while Cuc 
remains a ‘person’ (that is, an agent). It seems that he would consider Cuc Now to be 
a person on the basis of her apparent ability to act for some voluntarily chosen 
purposes. Cuc’s condition is, however, degenerative. Buchanan opines that there 
will be cases like that of a profoundly and permanently damaged demented individual 
with Alzheimer’s dementia, where neurological damage has destroyed a person, and 
all that survives is a terminally ill nonperson with what we may call radically 
truncated interests.
22
 
Thus, at some point in the future, Buchanan would hold that Cuc Then’s advance 
refusal will gain authority on the basis that she will have neurologically deteriorated 
to the point of being a ‘nonperson’ to whom it would be legitimate to apply Cuc 
Then’s ‘surviving interests’. 
Eve: Animal Heart Valve Refused in Advance of Memory Loss 
Since her brain injury, Eve identifies as a woman, eats meat and exercises 
extensively. Before her brain injury, she was a sedentary man known as Evan. Evan 
had been diagnosed with a heart condition that would, at some future date, require a 
replacement heart valve. As a life-long vegan, he made an advance refusal of use of 
an animal valve in his treatment. The brain injury has caused apparently permanent 
memory loss. Eve’s family say that she is now a different person to Evan. When 
informed that she needs a replacement heart valve, she opts for an animal valve 
because a mechanical valve would limit her physical activity and ability to exercise. 
Her doctors consider her competent to make this decision. 
Irrespective of the personal identity objection, Evan’s advance refusal lacks authority 
over Eve, because of her ability to make a contemporaneous decision. It does not 
matter whether Eve and Evan are the same or different individuals. Eve’s will takes 
priority over her earlier will and, a fortiori, over the will of a different person who 
once inhabited her body. What is, however, interesting about this hypothetical patient 
is that Evan and Eve do not seem to share a personality or personality-related 
memories. It therefore seems to me that Dresser and Buchanan would consider Eve to 
lack sufficient psychological continuity with Evan to be regarded as the same 
individual. 
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  Consider eg Buchanan, n 4, 281. 
22
  Buchanan, n 4, 285. 
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The relationship between Evan and Eve is of relevance to matters outside the context 
of advance refusals. Yet, English law does not remove an individual’s debts or 
property solely on account of a subsequent radical personality change or loss of 
competence. Evan is not, for any legal purposes, considered to be dead and replaced 
by another individual inhabiting or being his body. Eve is not, for example, freed 
from responsibility for Evan’s crimes on account of her loss of memory or personality 
change. Evan is not regarded as having died, but is the same legal person as Eve. 
III. The Mental Capacity Act and Court of Protection 
This section will examine the response of English law to the three hypothetical 
patients outlined above. Our starting point must be the Mental Capacity Act 2005. 
The 2005 Act only applies where the patient is reasonably believed to lack capacity to 
make a particular decision. That is, where an impairment or disturbance in the 
functioning of the mind or brain (s 2(1)) has rendered the patient unable to understand 
the relevant information, retain it, use or weigh it, or communicate the resulting 
decision (s 3(1)). On this test, Eve will be regarded as able to make a legally valid 
contemporaneous decision. ‘Evan’s’ advance refusal is therefore legally irrelevant. 
The law makes no inquiry as to whether or not Evan and Eve are the same person. 
In contrast, Bob and Cuc now lack legal capacity. If their advance refusals lack legal 
validity, then they are to be treated in accordance with their ‘best interests’ under the 
2005 Act. The decision-maker is to weigh all factors about which he or she is aware 
and ‘it would be reasonable to regard as relevant’ (s 4(2)/(11). This includes the 
patient’s ‘past and present wishes and feelings’ and their relevant ‘beliefs and values’ 
(s 4(6)). Thus, whereas a ‘valid’ and ‘applicable’ advance refusal is binding, other 
past views and values are merely factors to be weighed by the decision-maker. The 
Act gives no guidance as to the weight to be given to any of these factors. Let us 
consider the application of the best interests test to Bob and Cuc, on the assumption 
that their advance refusals are not valid and applicable. Bob seems to have no 
experiences at all and English law would not regard his continued treatment to be in 
his best interests, but would, in practice, require referral to the Court of Protection to 
confirm his diagnosis and prognosis as one of a ‘permanent vegetative state’.23 Cuc 
has apparently positive experiences (such as reading and painting), so the best interest 
test operating (as it does) in accordance with a presumption in favour of life
24
 would 
favour the administration of life-sustaining treatment, unless significant weight is 
given to her past views and values. Thus, a binding advance refusal would support a 
quicker rejection of life-sustaining treatment for Bob and would support removal of 
otherwise required life-sustaining treatment with regard to Cuc.  
To be valid, an advance refusal must not have been directly or indirectly withdrawn. 
More specifically, it is rendered invalid where the patient has: 
(a) withdrawn it when he/she has capacity to do so; 
(b) subsequently conferred the authority to make the relevant decision on an 
                                                 
23
  See eg Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 and Aintree University Hospitals NHS 
Foundation Trust v James [2013] UKSC 67, [36] and [47]. 
24
  eg Re T [1993] Fam 95, 112 and Aintree [2013] UKSC 67, [35]. 
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attorney; or 
(c) ‘done anything else clearly inconsistent with the advance decision 
remaining his fixed decision’ (s 25(2)). 
Neither (a) nor (b) apply to Bob or Cuc. In my view (c), withdrawal by inconsistent 
conduct, should be interpreted as requiring that the inconsistent act take place while 
the patient has capacity.
25
 That is because an alternative interpretation would render 
(a) superfluous and the restriction of (c) to the inconsistent behaviour of a patient with 
capacity is supported by the example given in the Code of Practice.
26
 There is, 
however, a common law presumption in favour of prolonging life, which the 
European Court of Human Rights has opined (in a case concerning an advance 
request) ‘accords with the spirit of the Convention’.27 It is possible, though I believe 
unlikely, that this presumption could be used to support an interpretation of (c) that 
permits effect to be given to the desire of a patient lacking capacity for clinically 
indicated life-prolonging treatment refused in advance. Bob and Cuc cannot, however, 
be properly said to have ‘done’ anything ‘clearly inconsistent’ with the terms of their 
advance refusals. Losing the ability to interact or communicate (Bob) or being in a 
very happy demented state (Cuc) are not relevant actions. 
To be applicable, the advance refusal must apply to the treatment and circumstances 
now faced by the patient (s 25(4)) and, in the case of life-sustaining treatment, must 
be explicit, in writing, signed and witnessed (s 25(5)/(6)). Section 25(4)(c) declares an 
advance refusal to be inapplicable where there are ‘reasonable grounds for believing 
that circumstances exist which [the patient] … did not anticipate at the time of the 
advance decision and which would have affected his decision had he anticipated 
them’ (s 25(4)(c)). This cannot be said to be the case with regard to Bob, whose 
advance refusal anticipates the very circumstances in which he now finds himself. 
Cuc clearly anticipated becoming more demented, but did she anticipate being in a 
very happy demented state and, if not, would that have changed her view? The sketch 
of her situation above does not specify why she made the advance refusal (there 
might, of course, be means of acquiring that information from others). But her blanket 
refusal of future treatment does not attempt to distinguish between situations where 
non-treatment would cause distress to her future self. This suggests that her concern 
was not to avoid any future suffering but being kept alive in a demented state. 
Notice that neither validity nor applicability deny legal authority to an advance refusal 
on account of their drafter being a different person to the current patient. Rather, both 
are concerned with the first challenge identified in relation to Anna, namely, the 
challenge of ensuring that the advance refusal sufficiently represents her will on what 
should happen in the situation in which she now finds herself. On the face of it, the 
law’s response to this first challenge makes it easy to disregard an advance refusal. 
Indeed, many commentators have pointed to the ease by which an advance refusal—
previously under the common law and now under the Act—can be deprived of legal 
                                                 
25
  See SD Pattinson, Medical Law and Ethics 1st edn (Sweet & Maxwell, 2006) 483 and 4th edn 
(Sweet & Maxwell, 2014) 494. 
26
  See Department for Constitutional Affairs, Mental Capacity Act: Code of Practice (The 
Stationery Office, 2007) para 9.40. 
27
 Burke v UK (No 19807/06, 7 July 2006). 
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authority.
28
 
The potential liability of doctors is, for example, loaded in favour of their 
disregarding an advance refusal, rather than following it. Under s 26(2), the doctor 
avoids liability for disregarding an advance refusal, unless ‘he is satisfied’ that it 
exists, is valid and is applicable. Under s 26(3), a doctor avoids liability when giving 
effect to an advance refusal where ‘he reasonably believes’ that it exists, is valid and 
is applicable. Thus, it appears to be harder to sue or convict a doctor for disregarding 
an advance refusal (it must be shown that he was satisfied that it had legal authority) 
than it is to sue/convict him for giving effect to it (it must be shown that either he did 
not believe it to have legal authority or any belief that it had legal authority was not 
reasonable).  
Recent case law has, however, gone some way towards interpreting the provisions of 
the Act so as to ensure that effect is given to the will of the individual who made the 
advance refusal. 
In X Primary Care Trust v XB, an advance refusal was interpreted so as to give effect 
to a patient’s prior will, determined from oral evidence, despite the written document 
itself referring to his invasive ventilation device as ‘non-invasive ventilation’ and 
including the words ‘valid until’ followed by a date that had expired by the time of 
the hearing.
29
 Thus, the terms of a written advance refusal are viewed as no more than 
evidence of the patient’s previous will and thereby subject to interpretation in the light 
of other evidence. 
In Newcastle upon Tyne Hospitals Foundation Trust v LM, the Court of Protection 
gave effect to the patient’s prior wish not to be given a blood transfusion, despite her 
advance refusal apparently not having been written, signed and witnessed, as required 
for an advance refusal of life-sustaining treatment to be applicable under the 2005 
Act.
30
 Peter Jackson J held that in consequence of the refusal being clear and 
capacitated ‘the doctors rightly considered [that it] must be respected’ and ‘in the 
alternative’, giving ‘determinate weight’ to her long-standing beliefs and values when 
applying s 4(6), the blood transfusion was not in her best interests.
31
 Thus, a refusal 
that technically does not satisfy the strict provisions of the 2005 Act for a binding 
advance refusal could still be given effect. In my view, his Lordship’s ‘alternative’ is 
best understood as being no more than an alternative expression of the same point, 
rather than an alternative ground for the decision. This avoids his Lordship being 
interpreted as rejecting the clear words of the legislation.
32
 
Giving considerable weight to the patient’s previous views when applying the best 
interest test is the approach required by the Supreme Court in a case decided in the 
                                                 
28
  See eg S Michalowski, ‘Advance Refusals of Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment: The 
Relativity of the Absolute Right’ (2005) 68 Modern Law Review 958 and AR MacLean, 
‘Advance Directives and the Rocky Waters of Anticipatory Decision-Making’ (2008) 16 
Medical Law Review 1. For a comparative consideration see S Halliday, ‘Legislating to Give 
Effect to Precedent Autonomy: Comparative Reflections on Legislative Incompetence’ (2011) 
11 Medical Law International 127. 
29
  [2012] EWHC 1390, esp at [10] and [15]. 
30
  [2014] EWHC 454 (COP). 
31
  [2014] EWHC 454, [22] and [23]. 
32
  This would involve the replacement of the decision of a democratically elected body with 
those of a non-democratically elected judge without any weighty justification. See further 
below. 
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year before LM. In Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James, 
Lady Hale (with whom the other Justices agreed) declared: 
insofar as Sir Alan Ward and Arden LJ were suggesting [in the court below] that the 
test of the patient’s wishes and feelings was an objective one, what the reasonable 
patient would think, again I respectfully disagree. The purpose of the best interests 
test is to consider matters from the patient’s point of view. That is not to say that his 
wishes must prevail, any more than those of a fully capable patient must prevail.
33
  
This is a very significant judgment. As indicated earlier, on its face the 2005 Act 
appears to relegate previous views and values not satisfying the procedural 
requirements for a binding advance refusal to mere factors to be weighed against 
other potentially equally important factors. Indeed, operating in the context of a 
presumption in favour of life, the application of the best interests test seemed to give 
relatively little weight to the patient’s prior views and values. 34  It is difficult to 
reconcile apparently binding force being given to advance refusals satisfying certain 
procedural requirements when advance refusals falling just short of satisfying those 
requirements are dealt with as mere factors in the application of the best interests test. 
The best interests test asks the decision-maker to determine what is in the patient’s 
‘objective’ interests, whereas a substituted judgement test seeks to ask the decision-
maker to attempt to make the decision that the patient would have made by applying 
the patient’s views and values.35 Giving effect to advance refusals would seem, as a 
matter of normative consistency, to support adoption of the substituted judgement test 
over the best interests test in those cases where the patient had previous views and 
values that fall just short of the procedural clarity required for a binding advance 
refusal. Aintree and LM, however, go a long way towards removing any such 
normative inconsistency. They seem to take us as close to a ‘substituted judgement’ 
test as is possible without expressly adopting it over the ‘best interests’ test, which the 
courts cannot do within the terms of the 2005 Act. 
Lady Hale added, with regard to the patient in a minimally conscious state with whom 
she was concerned in Aintree, ‘[e]ven if it is possible to determine what his views 
were in the past, they might well have changed in the light of the stresses and strains 
of his current predicament’.36 Notice that her concerns remain focused on the first 
challenge (that is, understanding what the patient would have actually wanted in the 
situation in which he now finds himself), rather than the second challenge (that is, the 
personal identity objection).  
Hayden J in Sheffield Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v TH has, however, 
interpreted Lady Hale’s view on the best interests test to be further away from the 
substituted judgement test than I have suggested. His Lordship interprets Lady Hale 
as holding that best interests are to be considered ‘in an holistic way’37 and cautions 
that: 
                                                 
33
 [2013] UKSC 67, [45]. 
34
  See eg Re T [1993] Fam 95 and HE v Hospital NHS Trust [2003] EWHC 1017. See also the 
discussion in Michalowski, n 27. 
35
  See further Pattinson, n 6, 148–50. 
36
  [2013] UKSC 67, [45].  
37
  [2014] EWCOP 4, [36]. 
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‘Wishes’ and ‘best interests’ should never be conflated, they are entirely separate 
matters which may ultimately weigh on different sides of the balance sheet.
38
 
It may be that this is less of a retreat from the substituted judgement test than it first 
appears to be. In the sentences immediately before, Hayden J emphasised the 
importance of ‘rigorous and scrupulous’ attempts to seek out past views on the basis 
that ‘the clarity, cogency and force that they are found to have will have a direct 
impact on the weight they are to be given’.39 It is therefore possible to view Hayden J 
as emphasising caution when attributing determinate previous views to the patient. 
Indeed, as we shall see, moral precaution may legitimately require us to consider any 
ambiguities in the patient’s past views in a way that is protective of their current 
positive experiences. 
In summary, English law does not consider apparent memory loss or personality 
change as a basis for concluding that there has been a change of identity. Anna, Bob, 
Cuc and Eve would be considered to have retained their identities over time. An 
advance refusal may lack legal authority on the basis that it lacks sufficient 
compliance with procedural safeguards to be considered determinate of the patient’s 
previous wishes, but those safeguards do not turn on a judgement concerned with loss 
of, or diminution in, psychological continuity. 
IV. Advance Refusals and a Good Faith Attempt to Give Effect to the PGC 
This section will first outline the moral theory under discussion in this book and then 
apply that moral theory to the personal identity objection to the authority of advance 
refusals. 
The Principle of Generic Consistency 
In their book Law as a Moral Judgment, Beyleveld and Brownsword argue that legal 
validity consists in the exercise of morally legitimate power.
40
 Their starting point for 
analysis is ‘the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules’.41 
This enterprise, they argue, can only be understood in terms of the reasons that 
individuals have for complying with those rules, which is to say that the law must be 
viewed as an affair of practical reason. If practical reason can be shown to presuppose 
moral reason, it would follow that the legal enterprise is necessarily a moral 
enterprise. Gewirth’s argument for the Principle of Generic Consistency (the PGC) 
seeks to show that practical reason does indeed presuppose moral reason. It uses a 
‘dialectically necessary’ method, whereby the argument proceeds dialectically within 
the first-person perspective of an agent with all the steps of the argument following 
logically (that is, necessarily) from premises that cannot be coherently denied within 
this perspective (that is, necessary premises). In essence, Gewirth seeks to show that I 
(an agent) deny that I am an agent if I deny that all agents have rights to the generic 
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conditions of agency (that is, the generic rights). This chapter will assume the 
soundness of Gewirth’s dialectically necessary argument to the PGC. A summary of 
that argument can be found in the first and final chapters of this book.
42
 
Gewirth distinguishes between the ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ application of the PGC.43 
Direct applications involve substantive determinations as to whether or not actions are 
compatible with the generic rights of agents. For those matters that cannot be dealt 
with directly, the PGC requires certain procedural mechanisms in its application, 
which indirectly apply the PGC. 
The generic rights established by Gewirth’s dialectically necessary argument are 
claims-rights according to the will conception of rights.
44
 That is to say, that they are 
to be understood as justifiable claims imposing correlative duties, the benefits of 
which are waivable by the rights-holder. Rights according to the will conception 
(will-rights) are to be contrasted with rights according to the interest conception 
(interest-rights), the benefits of which are not automatically waivable by the rights-
holder.
45
 
The generic rights are both negative (that is, rights of non-interference) and positive 
(that is, rights to assistance). They are rights to retain and obtain whatever an agent 
needs to act or act successfully, regardless of his specific purpose. These generic 
needs vary in degree. The generic needs and the corresponding generic rights can 
therefore be ranked according to the ‘criterion of degrees of needfulness for action’.46 
Death may be an agent’s purpose, or a consequence of it, but death itself is not a 
generic need. An agent who refuses life-sustaining treatment is therefore to be 
understood as exercising his or her generic rights, rather than claiming a generic right 
to die. 
In addition to granting generic rights to agents, Gewirth considers the PGC to apply to 
non-agents who ‘approach’ being agents, and cites children and ‘mentally deficient 
persons’ as examples of beings with partial generic rights.47 Unfortunately, Gewirth’s 
argument to the PGC cannot establish that non-agents have any generic rights at all, 
no matter how close they approach being agents.
48
 Gewirth has inferred that those 
others who act like agents (such as Cuc and Eve) are agents and those who display 
some but not all of the characteristics and behaviour expected of agents (such as Bob 
or a more demented Cuc) are non-agents who merely approach being agents. This 
inference is intuitive and seems perfectly reasonable, but it is not epistemologically 
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secure. Agency involves a special kind of self-awareness (that is, reflective 
purposivity), which means that while I can know directly that I am an agent, I cannot 
know this directly of anyone other than myself. The inferences made by Gewirth 
about ‘normal adults’, children or ‘mentally deficient persons’—which we all make 
on a day-to-day basis—depend on unverifiable metaphysical assumptions. I cannot 
eliminate the possibility that those others who behave like agents are very cleverly 
programmed robots without minds and that those others who do not behave like 
agents are actually locked-in agents unable to fully display their agency to me. Those 
possibilities are relevant to the application of the categorical requirement that I (any 
agent) act in accordance with the generic rights of agents. 
I cannot strictly know whether or not Eve or Cuc are agents, but I can treat them as 
agents because they behave like agents. To mistakenly treat them as agents would 
involve unnecessarily restricting my freedom of action, but to mistakenly treat them 
as non-agents would be to fail to respect their generic rights, despite being able to do 
so. The PGC therefore requires me to treat Eva and Cuc (and anyone else who acts 
like an agent) as agents and act in accordance with their (presumed) generic rights.
 
It 
follows that agency-like characteristics and behaviour must, under moral precaution, 
be considered evidence of agency. 
Since Bob or a more demented Cuc do not behave like agents, I cannot coherently 
treat them as if they are able to exercise the generic rights. It is, however, possible and 
meaningful for me to guard against mistakenly treating them as non-agents by acting 
towards them in ways that would respect their generic rights should they 
(unknowably) happen to be agents. It is therefore dialectically necessary for me to 
grant Bob or any other being that displays some agency-like characteristics ‘duties of 
protection’ tracking their (presumed) generic interests. Thus, Eve and Cuc Now are to 
be treated as having will-rights to their presumed generic interests, whereas Bob and a 
more demented Cuc are to be treated as having interest-rights to their presumed 
generic interests. 
What if I am faced with a single-variable conflict between respecting one of Eve’s 
will-rights and respecting Bob’s equivalent interest-right? If no other variables arise, 
my duties to Eve take precedence over my duties to Bob. This is an application of the 
‘criterion of avoidance of more probable harm’.49 Moral precaution requires me to 
consider agency-like characteristics and behaviour to be evidence of agency, and Eve 
can be treated as an agent and therefore displays more of those characteristics than 
Bob, who cannot be treated as an agent. Thus, in a single-variable conflict of the type 
under consideration, an agent’s duties to those others who can meaningfully be treated 
as having (presumed) generic interests will be proportionate to the degree to which 
those others approach being analogically agents. In single variable disputes, Eve and 
Cuc count for more than very demented future Cuc, who in turn counts for more than 
Bob. There can, however, be differences not only between the agency-like behaviour 
displayed, but also the importance of the generic conditions affected
50
 and the 
probability of any given action having effects on the generic conditions. Where, as 
here, the PGC-relevant values have not been rendered commensurable within an 
algorithm directly supported by the PGC, the best that we can do is rely on a 
procedural turn, operating to protect the unequivocally most important values of the 
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PGC. The procedure must be one seeking, in good faith, to give effect to the PGC. 
Beyleveld and Brownsword have considered the need for PGC-compliant procedures 
elsewhere.
51
 Ultimately, they argue, the justification for proceduralism also requires 
that we avoid ‘an infinite regress of one layer of proceduralism on another’.52 In this 
light, they consider what a Gewirthian should make of the processes of representative 
government adopted by large modern democracies. It may well be the case that any 
given individual has not consented to the process by which delegated authority 
happens to be exercised by the State in which he or she lives and might not have 
voted for those who are elected at any given time. They argue that human agents, in 
recognising that their own judgement is not infallible, must consider a free, fair and 
transparent democratic process as simply the ‘optimal compromise’ by which 
committed Gewirthians can mutually co-exist in a complex society governed by the 
PGC.
53
 Gewirth refers to this as the ‘method of consent’.54 As an indirect application 
of the PGC, the democratic method only operates where there is ‘rational and not 
unreasonable disagreement’ over the direct application of the PGC for which there is 
no more optimal response.
55
 
Applying the PGC to the Personal Identity Objection 
The PGC only requires the personal identity objection to be dealt with indirectly 
where it cannot be dealt with directly. For the reasons below, any application of the 
PGC will place significant (and in some cases conclusive) restrictions on the 
permissibility of treating my past, present and future selves as distinct individuals and 
the past, present and future (presumed) selves of others as distinct individuals.  
In Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw, Beyleveld and Brownsword consider 
whether the PGC can be applied to give effect to the notion of duties to oneself by 
reference to a distinction between ‘my future selves’ and ‘my present self’.56 They 
argue that ‘my future self’ develops from, and is an extension of, ‘my present self’, 
and this makes the relationship between ‘my present self’ and ‘future selves’ different 
to my relations to others. It is for this reason, they argue, that ‘my future selves’ 
cannot call ‘my present self’ to account for harming them. 
If I could hold my ‘past selves’ to account, this would imply that I could never be held 
responsible in the future for my actions in the present. Therefore, in relation to a 
crucial aspect of rights-claims, I cannot properly be said to have past, present, and 
future selves. All there is, is me at different times.
57
 
I agree. The PGC places significant limitations on how we must consider the 
relationship between a living body and a particular agent over time. To regard a 
person who has just awoken as a different person to the one who went to sleep last 
night is both to free the present person from responsibility for the actions of the 
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person who went to sleep and to deprive the present person of the achievements, 
relationships and claims of the person who went to sleep. It deprives them of 
responsibility for infringing the rights of others and denies their claim to many 
specific rights for themselves. It follows that there are significant limits on the moral 
permissibility of treating a living human body as housing or being different agents 
over time. Continuity of identity over time cannot require an apparently unbroken 
continuity of consciousness. 
But what does this mean in the context of an advance refusal made by Anna? The 
personal identity objection requires action contrary to any presumption of continuity 
of identity, as it requires a distinction between Anna Then and Anna Now. Anna’s 
situation is not one where the costs of erring are all one way. We either mistakenly 
deny Anna’s authority to exercise her will over her body in the future or mistakenly 
fail to attempt to extend the now incompetent Anna’s biological life. But the 
conclusion that either is a morally significant risk is subject to a prior procedural 
assessment. 
Before concluding that following an advance refusal presents a morally significant 
risk of failing to extend the patient’s biological life, we must first conclude that, in the 
absence of the advance refusal, there is a duty to extend the patient’s life. The PGC 
does not impose an absolute duty to provide life-sustaining treatment. For a start, 
positive generic rights are more limited than negative generic rights
58
 and, when 
dealing with limited resources, relative moral status will be relevant (compare, for 
example, the status under moral precaution of Bob Now and Cuc Now). Determining 
whether there would otherwise be a duty to provide life-sustaining treatment involves 
a multiple variable calculation of the type requiring a PGC-compliant procedure. 
Before concluding that failing to follow an advance refusal presents a morally 
significant risk of denying an agent’s will over her body in the future, we must first 
conclude that the advance refusal captures what she would have wanted in the current 
situation. The PGC will again require a PGC-compliant response to this challenge. 
That response will need to take account of any procedural response to the question of 
whether there would otherwise be a duty to provide life-sustaining treatment to Anna. 
If it has been legitimately concluded that there would otherwise be such a duty, then 
moral precaution will need to be exercised when interpreting any ambiguities in her 
previously expressed views. Without examining this issue in depth, it is worth noting 
that the 2005 Act’s requirements of ‘validity’ and ‘applicability’ are a response to this 
challenge by an elected body. 
In short, the personal identity objection only arises for consideration as a challenge to 
the authority of Anna’s advance refusal if we have already legitimately concluded that 
the refusal covers the current situation and there would otherwise be a duty to provide 
the life-sustaining treatment. Cuc’s situation is one in which it is plausible that PGC-
compatible procedures would support reaching these two conclusions. The demented 
Cuc currently behaves like an (incompetent) agent and administering the antibiotics 
poses no undue burden, she therefore has a very strong claim to a positive right to the 
antibiotics expected to save her life. If we assume that her refusal is witnessed, in 
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writing, and expressly states that it applies even if she is in a happy demented state, it 
is difficult to see how it may be legitimately concluded that it did not represent her 
will with regard to the current situation. In these circumstances, is the case for 
accepting the personal identity objection as plausible as the case for rejecting the 
objection? Two factors suggest not. 
First, the criteria for identity and their application to Cuc must be compatible with the 
PGC, and this is questionable in relation to the personal identity objection. It vests 
identity in the retention of memories and personality traits above a certain threshold. 
But, it is not at all clear why an agent’s identity must be defined and determined in 
this way. When Cuc makes an advance refusal that she intends to take effect even 
when her memory retention and personality traits fall below that threshold, why must 
she nonetheless accept that her future body will then house or be another agent? Why 
must others identify Cuc not in terms of her apparent retention of agency-like 
characteristics and behaviour over time, but in terms of a specific level of apparent 
retention of memory and personality traits? 
Even if the PGC could support the Lockean-Parfitian theory of identity, it is not at all 
clear how we would identify the threshold point for apparent retention of memory and 
personality traits. At what point is it legitimate to conclude that Cuc’s memories and 
personality traits are such that her body has ceased to be (or house) one presumed 
agent and is now (or now houses) another presumed agent? Wherever that point is, 
since Eve and Evan’s memories and personality traits seem to be no more closely 
connected than those of Cuc Then and Cuc Now, they must also be regarded as 
having crossed that point. Any threshold of identity requiring Cuc Then to be 
regarded as a different agent to Cuc Now would have significant implications for 
when an individual is regarded as having ceased to exist. The psychological 
continuity criterion of identity implies that where an individual apparently loses and 
later regains their memories and personality traits, as in the case of some forms of 
mental illness, they are to be regarded as having lost one identity and then regained it; 
which seems to require that they be considered to have died and come back to life. 
Secondly, the personal identity objection requires us to make more assumptions to 
accept it than it does to reject it. To reject the personal identity objection, I need to 
accept or assume that either Cuc has remained the same agent or consider Cuc Then’s 
views on the treatment of Cuc Now to take priority over the views of other third 
parties. This second move is plausible because the two Cucs share a more intimate 
relationship than anyone else has with Cuc Now. To accept the personal identity 
objection, I need to accept or assume the converse of both of these points. Thus, I 
need to consider Cuc’s body to be connected to, or be, a different agent to that to 
which it was connected when the advance refusal was made and consider her 
treatment decisions to be better made by someone other than Cuc Then. 
If those factors do not, as I suggest, support rejection of the personal identity 
objection, they do at least justify the conclusion that a PGC-compliant procedure 
could in good faith reject the personal identity objection. That is to say that if the 
UK’s democratic process is compatible with the PGC’s requirements, then the 
approach of English law to the personal identity objection may at least be regarded as 
an indirect application of the PGC. 
V. Conclusion 
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Assessing English law in terms of the requirements of an indirect application of the 
PGC, it need not be shown that the approach taken by English law is the only one 
capable of being supported by the PGC. Rather, it needs only be shown that English 
law takes an approach compatible with a good faith attempt to give effect to the PGC. 
This I have done. I have argued that the personal identity objection requires more than 
the claim that life-sustaining treatment should not be removed at the whim of a third 
party. It requires the moral defensibility of three additional claims:  
(1)  personal identity is to be determined according to ‘psychological continuity’, 
assessed by apparent retention of interpersonal memories and personality 
traits, 
(2)  the threshold of psychological continuity is such that Anna Then is to be 
regarded as having a different identity to Anna Now, and  
(3)  Anna Then has a weaker right to make decisions for Anna Now than another 
third party.  
Since a good faith application of the PGC may legitimately reject these claims and 
assumptions, it is morally defensible for English law to reject the personal identity 
objection in relation to Anna, Bob and Cuc. These claims will similarly pose 
significant justificatory problems for other moral theories and their acceptance would 
require a radical reconsideration of when an individual is regarded as having died or 
otherwise freed from existing entitlements, obligations and relationships. 
This chapter has examined the views of Dresser and Buchanan to demonstrate that the 
personal identity objection is no ‘straw man’ and there are, indeed, other supporters of 
this objection.
59
 The position advanced by these theorists requires us to consider both 
Bob Now and Cuc Now to be different individuals to those who made the advance 
refusals. Dresser would seem to consider the personal identity objection to apply to 
Bob and Cuc, and Buchanan would consider it to apply to Cuc. It is morally and 
legally defensible for the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and the English Courts to reject 
these views. 
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